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Abstract
The article proposes an expert system for detection, and subsequent investigation, of groups of collaborating automobile insurance
fraudsters. The system is described and examined in great detail, several technical difficulties in detecting fraud are also considered,
for it to be applicable in practice. Opposed to many other approaches, the system uses networks for representation of data. Networks
are the most natural representation of such a relational domain, allowing formulation and analysis of complex relations between
entities. Fraudulent entities are found by employing a novel assessment algorithm, Iterative Assessment Algorithm (IAA), also
presented in the article. Besides intrinsic attributes of entities, the algorithm explores also the relations between entities. The
prototype was evaluated and rigorously analyzed on real world data. Results show that automobile insurance fraud can be efficiently
detected with the proposed system and that appropriate data representation is vital.
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1. Introduction
Fraud is encountered in a variety of domains. It comes in all
different shapes and sizes, from traditional fraud, e.g. (simple)
tax cheating, to more sophisticated, where entire groups of indi-
viduals are collaborating in order to commit fraud. Such groups
can be found in the automobile insurance domain.
Here fraudsters stage traffic accidents and issue fake insur-
ance claims to gain (unjustified) funds from their general or
vehicle insurance. There are also cases where an accident has
never occurred, and the vehicles have only been placed onto the
road. Still, the majority of such fraud is not planned (oppor-
tunistic fraud) – an individual only seizes the opportunity aris-
ing from the accident and issues exaggerated insurance claims
or claims for past damages.
Staged accidents have several common characteristics. They
occur in late hours and non-urban areas in order to reduce the
probability of witnesses. Drivers are usually younger males,
there are many passengers in the vehicles, but never children
or elders. The police is always called to the scene to make the
subsequent acquisition of means easier. It is also not uncom-
mon that all of the participants have multiple (serious) injuries,
when there is almost no damage on the vehicles. Many other
suspicious characteristics exist, not mentioned here.
The insurance companies place the most interest in organized
groups of fraudsters consisting of drivers, chiropractors, garage
mechanics, lawyers, police officers, insurance workers and oth-
ers. Such groups represent the majority of revenue leakage.
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Most of the analyses agree that approximately 20% of all in-
surance claims are in some way fraudulent (various resources).
But most of these claims go unnoticed, as fraud investigation
is usually done by hand by the domain expert or investigator
and is only rarely computer supported. Inappropriate represen-
tation of data is also common, making the detection of groups
of fraudsters extremely difficult. An expert system approach is
thus needed.
Jensen (1997) has observed several technical difficulties in
detecting fraud (various domains). Most hold for (automobile)
insurance fraud as well. Firstly, only a small portion of acci-
dents or participants is fraudulent (skewed class distribution)
making them extremely difficult to detect. Next, there is a se-
vere lack of labeled data sets as labeling is expensive and time
consuming. Besides, due to sensitivity of the domain, there is
even a lack of unlabeled data sets. Any approach for detecting
such fraud should thus be founded on moderate resources (data
sets) in order to be applicable in practice. Fraudsters are very in-
novative and new types of fraud emerge constantly. Hence, the
approach must also be highly adaptable, detecting new types
of fraud as soon as they are noticed. Lastly, it holds that fully
autonomous detection of automobile insurance fraud is not pos-
sible in practice. Final assessment of potential fraud can only
be made by the domain expert or investigator, who also deter-
mines further actions in resolving it. The approach should also
support this investigation process.
Due to everything mentioned above, the set of approaches
for detecting such fraud is extremely limited. We propose a
novel expert system approach for detection and subsequent in-
vestigation of automobile insurance fraud. The system is fo-
cused on detection of groups of collaborating fraudsters, and
their connecting accidents (non-opportunistic fraud), and not
some isolated fraudulent entities. The latter should be done in-
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dependently for each particular entity, while in our system, the
entities are assessed in a way that considers also the relations
between them. This is done with appropriate representation of
the domain – networks.
Networks are the most natural representation of any rela-
tional domain, allowing formulation of complex relations be-
tween entities. They also present the main advantage of our sys-
tem against other approaches that use a standard flat data form.
As collaborating fraudsters are usually related to each other in
various ways, detection of groups of fraudsters is only possible
with appropriate representation of data. Networks also provide
clear visualization of the assessment, crucial for the subsequent
investigation process.
The system assesses the entities using a novel Iterative As-
sessment Algorithm (IAA algorithm), presented in this article.
No learning from initial labeled data set is done, the system
rather allows simple incorporation of the domain knowledge.
This makes it applicable in practice and allows detection of new
types of fraud as soon as they are encountered. The system can
be used with poor data sets, which is often the case in practice.
To simulate realistic conditions, the discussion in the article and
evaluation with the prototype system relies only on the data and
entities found in the police record of the accident (main entities
are participant, vehicle, collision1, police officer).
The article makes an in depth description, evaluation and
analysis of the proposed system. We pursue the hypothesis that
automobile insurance fraud can be detected with such a system
and that proper data representation is vital. Main contributions
of our work are: (1) a novel expert system approach for the
detection of automobile insurance fraud with networks; (2) a
benchmarking study, as no expert system approach for detec-
tion of groups of automobile insurance fraudsters has yet been
reported (to our knowledge); (3) an algorithm for assessment of
entities in a relational domain, demanding no labeled data set
(IAA algorithm); and (4) a framework for detection of groups
of fraudsters with networks (applicable in other relational do-
mains).
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 2
we discuss related work and emphasize weaknesses of other
proposed approaches. Section 3 presents formal grounds of (so-
cial) networks. Next, in section 4, we introduce the proposed
expert system for detecting automobile insurance fraud. The
prototype system was evaluated and rigorously analyzed on real
world data, description of the data set and obtained results are
given in section 5. Discussion of the results is conducted in
section 6, followed by the conclusion in section 7.
2. Related work
Our work places in the wide field of fraud detection. Fraud
appears in many domains including telecommunications,
banking, medicine, e-commerce, general and automobile
1Throughout the article the term collision is used instead of (traffic) acci-
dent. The word accident implies there is no one to blame, which contradicts
with the article.
insurance. Thus a number of expert system approaches
for preventing, detecting and investigating fraud have been
developed in the past. Researches have proposed using some
standard methods of data mining and machine learning, neural
networks, fuzzy logic, genetic algorithms, support vector
machines, (logistic) regression, consolidated (classification)
trees, approaches over red-flags or profiles, various statistical
methods and other methods and approaches (Artis et al., 2002;
Brockett et al., 2002; Bolton & Hand, 2002; Estevez et al.,
2006; Furlan & Bajec, 2008; Ghosh & Schwartzbard, 1999;
Hu et al., 2007; Kirkos et al., 2007; Perez et al., 2005;
Rupnik et al., 2007; Quah & Sriganesh, 2008; Sanchez et al.,
2009; Viaene et al., 2002, 2005; Weisberg & Derrig, 1998;
Yang & Hwang, 2006). Analyses show that in practice none
is significantly better than others (Bolton & Hand, 2002;
Viaene et al., 2005). Furthermore, they mainly have three
weaknesses. They (1) use inappropriate or inexpressive
representation of data; (2) demand a labeled (initial) data set;
and (3) are only suitable for larger, richer data sets. It turns
out that these are generally a problem when dealing with fraud
detection (Jensen, 1997; Phua et al., 2005).
In the narrower sense, our work comes near the ap-
proaches from the field of network analysis, that combine
intrinsic attributes of entities with their relational attributes.
Noble & Cook (2003) proposed detecting anomalies in net-
works with various types of vertices, but they focus on de-
tecting suspicious structures in the network, not vertices (i.e.
entities). Besides that, the approach is more appropriate for
larger networks. Researchers also proposed detecting anoma-
lies using measures of centrality (Freeman, 1977, 1979), ran-
dom walks (Sun et al., 2005) and other (Holder & Cook, 2003;
Maxion & Tan, 2000), but these approaches mainly rely only
on the relational attributes of entities.
Many researchers have investigated the problem of clas-
sification in the relational context, following the hypoth-
esis that classification of an entity can be improved by
also considering its related entities (inference). Thus many
approaches formulating inference, spread or propagation
on networks have been developed in various fields of re-
search (Brin & Page, 1998; Domingos & Richardson, 2001;
Kleinberg, 1999; Kschischang & Frey, 1998; Lu & Getoor,
2003b; Minka, 2001; Neville & Jensen, 2000). Most
of them are based on one of the three most popular
(approximate) inference algorithms: Relaxation Labeling
(RL) (Hummel & Zucker, 1983) from the computer vision com-
munity, Loopy Belief Propagation (LBP) on loopy (Bayesian)
graphical models (Kschischang & Frey, 1998) and Iterative
Classification Algorithm (ICA) from the data mining commu-
nity (Neville & Jensen, 2000). For the analyses and comparison
see (Kempe et al., 2003; Sen & Getoor, 2007).
Researchers have reported good results with these algorithms
(Brin & Page, 1998; Kschischang & Frey, 1998; Lu & Getoor,
2003b; Neville & Jensen, 2000), however they mainly address
the problem of learning from an (initial) labeled data set (super-
vised learning), or a partially labeled (semi-supervised learn-
ing) (Lu & Getoor, 2003a), therefore the approaches are gen-
erally inappropriate for fraud detection. The algorithm we in-
2
troduce here, IAA algorithm, is almost identical to the ICA al-
gorithm, however it was developed with different intentions in
mind – to assess the entities when no labeled data set is at hand
(and not for improving classification with inference). Further-
more, IAA does not address the problem of classification, but
ranking. Thus, in this way, it is actually a simplification of
RL algorithm, or even Google’s PageRank (Brin & Page, 1998),
still it is not founded on the probability theory like the latter.
We conclude that due to the weaknesses mentioned, most of
the proposed approaches are inappropriate for detection of (au-
tomobile) insurance fraud. Our approach differs, as it does not
demand a labeled data set and is also appropriate for smaller
data sets. It represents data with networks, which are one of the
most natural representation and allow complex analysis without
simplification of data. It should be pointed out that networks,
despite their strong foundations and expressive power, have not
yet been used for detecting (automobile) insurance fraud (at
least according to our knowledge).
3. (Social) networks
Networks are based upon mathematical objects called
graphs. Informally speaking, graph consists of a collection of
points, called vertices, and links between these points, called
edges (Fig. 1). Let VG, EG be a set of vertices, edges for some
graph G respectively. We define G as G = (VG, EG) where
VG = {v1, v2 . . . vn}, (1)
EG ⊆ {{vi, v j}| vi, v j ∈ VG ∧ i , j}. (2)
Note that edges are sets of vertices, hence they are not directed
(undirected graph). In the case of directed graphs equation (2)
rewrites to
EG ⊆ {(vi, v j)| vi, v j ∈ VG ∧ i , j}, (3)
where edges are ordered pairs of vertices – (vi, v j) is an edge
from vi to v j. The definition can be further generalized by al-
lowing multiple edges between two vertices and loops (edges
that connect vertices with themselves). Such graphs are called
multigraphs. Examples of some simple (multi)graphs can be
seen in Fig. 1.
In practical applications we usually strive to store some extra
information along with the vertices and edges. Formally, we
can define two labeling functions
lVG : VG → ΣVG , (4)
lEG : EG → ΣEG , (5)
where ΣVG , ΣEG are (finite) alphabets of all possible vertex, edge
labels respectively. Labeled graph can be seen in Fig. 1 (b).
We proceed by introducing some terms used later on. Let
G be some undirected multigraph or an underlying graph of
some directed multigraph – underlying graph consists of same
vertices and edges as the original directed (multi)graph, only
that all of its edges are set to be undirected. G naturally parti-
tions into a set of (connected) components denoted C(G). E.g.
all three graphs in Fig. 1 have one connected component, when
Fig. 1: (a) simple graph with directed edges; (b) undirected multigraph with la-
beled vertices and edges (labels are represented graphically); (c) network repre-
senting collisions where round vertices correspond to participants and cornered
vertices correspond to vehicles. Collisions are represented with directed edges
between vehicles.
graphs in Fig. 2 consist of several connected components. From
here on, we assume that G consists of a single connected com-
ponent.
Let vi be some vertex in graph G, vi ∈ VG. Degree of the
vertex vi, denoted d(vi), is the number of edges incident to it.
Formally,
d(vi) = |{e| e ∈ EG ∧ vi ∈ e}|. (6)
Let v j be some other vertex in graph G, v j ∈ VG, and let p(vi, v j)
be a path between vi and v j. A path is a sequence of vertices
on a way that leads from one vertex to another (including vi
and v j). There can be many paths between two vertices. A
geodesic g(vi, v j) is a path that has the minimum size – consists
of the least number of vertices. Again, there can also be many
geodesics between two vertices.
We can now define the distance between two vertices, i.e. vi
and v j, as
d(vi, v j) = |g(vi, v j)| − 1. (7)
Distance between vi and v j is the number of edges visited when
going from vi to v j (or vice versa). The diameter of some graph
G, denoted d(G), is a measure for the “width” of the graph.
Formally, it is defined as the maximum distance between any
two vertices in the graph,
d(G) = max{d(vi, v j)| vi, v j ∈ VG}. (8)
All graphs can be divided into two classes. First are cyclic
graphs, having a path p(vi, vi) that contains at least two other
vertices (besides vi) and has no repeated vertices. Such path
is called a cycle. Graphs in Fig. 1 (a) and (b) are both cyclic.
Second class of graphs consists of acyclic graphs, more com-
monly known as trees. These are graphs that contain no cycle
(see Fig. 1 (c)). Note that a simple undirected graph is a tree if
and only if |EG| = |VG| − 1.
Finally, we introduce the vertex cover of a graph G. Let S be
a subset of vertices, S ⊆ VG, with a property that each edge in
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EG has at least one of its incident vertices in S (covered by S ).
Such S is called a vertex cover. It can be shown, that finding a
minimum vertex cover is NP-hard in general.
Graphs have been studied and investigated for almost 300
years thus a strong theory has been developed until today. There
are also numerous practical problems and applications where
graphs have shown their usefulness (e.g. Brin & Page, 1998) –
they are the most natural representation of many domains and
are indispensable whenever we are interested in relations be-
tween entities or in patterns in these relations. We emphasize
this only to show that networks have strong mathematical, and
also practical, foundation – networks2 are usually seen as la-
beled, or weighted, multigraphs with both directed and undi-
rected edges (see Fig. 1 (c)). Furthermore, vertices of a net-
work usually represent some entities, and edges represent some
relations between them. When vertices correspond to people,
or groups of people, such networks are called social networks.
Networks often consist of densely connected subsets of ver-
tices called communities. Formally, communities are subsets
of vertices with many edges between the vertices within some
community and only a few edges between the vertices of differ-
ent communities. Girvan & Newman (2002) suggested identi-
fying communities by recursively removing the edges between
them – between edges. As it holds that many geodesics run
along such edges, where only few geodesics run along edges
within communities, between edges can be removed by using
edge betweenness (Girvan & Newman, 2002). It is defined as
Bet(ei) = |{g(vi, v j)| vi, v j ∈ VG ∧ (9)
∧ g(vi, v j) goes along ei}|,
where ei ∈ EG. The edge betweenness Bet(ei) is thus the num-
ber of all geodesics that run along edge ei.
For more details on (social) networks see e.g. (Newman,
2003, 2008).
4. Expert system for detecting automobile insurance fraud
As mentioned above, the proposed expert system uses (pri-
marily constructed) networks of collisions to assign suspicion
score to each entity. These scores are used for the detec-
tion of groups of fraudsters and their corresponding collisions.
The framework of the system is structured into four modules
(Fig. 2).
In the first module, different types of networks are con-
structed from the given data set. When necessary, the networks
are also simplified – divided into natural communities that ap-
pear inside them. The latter is done without any loss of gener-
ality.
Networks from the first module naturally partition into sev-
eral connected components. In the second module we inves-
tigate these components and output the suspicious, focusing
mainly on their structural properties such as diameter, cycles,
etc. Other components are discarded at the end of this module.
2Throughout the article the terms graph and network are used as synonyms.
Fig. 2: Framework of the proposed expert system for detecting (automobile
insurance) fraud.
Not all entities in some suspicious component are necessar-
ily suspicious. In the third module components are thus further
analyzed in order to detect key entities inside them. They are
found by employing Iterative Assessment Algorithm (IAA), pre-
sented in this article. The algorithm assigns a suspicion score
to each entity, which can be used for subsequent assessment
and analysis – to identify suspicious groups of entities and their
connecting collisions. In general, suspicious groups are subsets
of suspicious components.
Note that detection of suspicious entities is done in two
stages (second and third module). In the first stage, or the sec-
ond module, we focus only on detecting suspicious components
and in the second stage, third module, we also locate the sus-
picious entities within them. Hence the detection in the first,
second stage is done at the level of components, entities respec-
tively. The reason for this hierarchical investigation is that early
stages simplify assessment in the later stages, possibly without
any loss for detection (for further implications see section 6).
It holds that fully autonomous detection of automobile in-
surance fraud is not possible in practice. The obtained results
should always be investigated by the domain expert or inves-
tigator, who determines further actions for resolving potential
fraud. The purpose of the last, fourth, module of the system is
thus to appropriately assess and visualize the obtained results,
allowing the domain expert or investigator to conduct subse-
quent analysis.
First three modules of the system are presented in sec-
tions 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 respectively, when the last module is only
briefly discussed in section 4.4.
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4.1. Representation with networks
Every entity’s attribute is either intrinsic or relational. Intrin-
sic attributes are those, that are independent of the entity’s sur-
rounding (e.g. person’s age), while the relational attributes rep-
resent, or are dependent on, relations between entities (e.g. re-
lation between two colliding drivers). Relational attributes can
be naturally represented with the edges of a network. Thus we
get networks, where vertices correspond to entities and edges
correspond to relations between them. Numerous different net-
works can be constructed, depending on which entities we use
and how we connect them to each other.
The purpose of this first module of the system is to construct
different types of networks, used later on. It is not immediately
clear how to construct networks, that describe the domain in the
best possible way and are most appropriate for our intentions.
This problem arises as networks, despite their high expressive
power, are destined to represent relations between only two en-
tities (i.e. binary relations). As collisions are actually relations
between multiple entities, some sort of projection of the data
set must be made (for other suggestions see section 7).
Collisions can thus be represented with various types of net-
works, not all equally suitable for fraud detection. In our opin-
ion, there are some guidelines that should be considered when
constructing networks from any relational domain data (guide-
lines are given approximately in the order of their importance):
1. Intention: networks should be constructed so that they are
most appropriate for our intentions (e.g. fraud detection)
2. Domain: networks should be constructed in a way that de-
scribes the domain as it is (e.g. connected vertices should
represent some entities, also directly connected in the data
set)
3. Expressiveness: expressive power of the constructed net-
works should be as high as possible
4. Structure: structure of the networks should not be used for
describing some specific domain characteristics (e.g. there
should be no cycles in the networks when there are no actual
cycles in the data set). Structural properties of networks are
a strong tool that can be used in the subsequent (investiga-
tion) process, but only when these properties were not artifi-
cially incorporated into the network during the construction
process
5. Simplicity: networks should be kept as simple and sparse as
possible (e.g. not all entities need to be represented by its
own vertices). The hypothesis here is that simple networks
would also allow simpler subsequent analysis and clearer fi-
nal visualization (principle of Occam’s razor3)
6. Uniqueness: every network should uniquely describe the
data set being represented (i.e. there should be a bijection
between different data sets and corresponding networks)
Frequently all guidelines can not be met and some trade-off
have to be made.
3The principle states that the explanation of any phenomenon should make
as few assumptions as possible, eliminating those making no difference in the
assessment – entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity.
In general there are
(3
1
)
+
(3
2
)
+ (
(3
2
)
+
(3
3
)
) = 10 possible ways
how to connect three entities (i.e. collision, participant and ve-
hicle), depending on which entities we represent with their own
vertices. 7 of these represent participants with vertices and in 4
cases all entities are represented by their own vertices. For the
reason of simplicity, we focus on the remaining 3 cases. In the
following we introduce four different types of such networks,
as an example and for later use. All can be seen in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3: Four types of networks representing same two collisions – (a) drivers
network, (b) participants network, (c) COPTA network and (d) vehicles net-
work. Rounded vertices correspond to participants, hexagons correspond to
collisions and irregular cornered vertices correspond to vehicles. Solid directed
edges represent involvement in some collision, solid undirected edges represent
drivers (only for the vehicles network) and dashed edges represent passengers.
Guilt in the collision is formulated with edge’s direction.
The simplest way is to only connect the drivers who were
involved in the same collision – drivers networks. Guilt in the
collision is formulated with edge’s direction. Note that drivers
networks severely lack expressive power (guideline 3). We
can therefore add the passengers and get participants networks,
where passengers are connected with the corresponding drivers.
Such networks are already much richer, but they have one major
weakness – passengers “group” on the driver, i.e. it is generally
not clear which passengers were involved in the same collision
and not even how many passengers were involved in some par-
ticular collision (guidelines 3, 6).
This weakness is partially eliminated by COnnect Passengers
Through Accidents networks (COPTA networks). We add spe-
cial vertices representing collisions and all participants in some
collision are now connected through these vertices. Passengers
no longer group on the drivers but on the collisions, thus the
problem is partially eliminated. We also add special edges be-
tween the drivers and the collisions, to indicate the number of
passengers in the vehicle. This type of networks could be ad-
equate for many practical applications, but it should be men-
tioned that the distance between two colliding drivers is now
twice as large as before – the drivers are those that were directly
related in the collision (guideline 2, 5).
Last type of networks are vehicles networks where special
vertices are added to represent vehicles. Collisions are now rep-
resented by edges between vehicles, and driver and passengers
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are connected through them. Such networks provide good vi-
sualization of the collisions and also incorporate another entity,
but they have many weaknesses as well. Two colliding drivers
are very far apart and (included) vehicles are not actually of our
interest (guideline 5). Such networks also seem to suggest that
the vehicles are the ones, responsible for the collision (guide-
line 2). Vehicles networks are also much larger than the previ-
ous.
A better way to incorporate vehicles into networks is sim-
ply to connect collisions, in which the same vehicle was in-
volved. Similar holds for other entities like police officers, chi-
ropractors, lawyers, etc. Using special vertices for these enti-
ties would only unnecessarily enlarge the networks and conse-
quently make subsequent detection harder (guidelines 1, 5). It
is also true, that these entities usually aren’t available in practice
(sensitivity of the domain).
Summary of the analysis of different types of networks is
given in table 1.
Guidelines and networks
drivers particip. COPTA vehicles
Intention + ++ 5
+ ++
Domain − − 4
Expressive. −− − + 4
Structure 4
Simplicity + − −− 3
Uniqueness − − − 2
Total 0 4 −9 −8
−5 −1 1 −8
Table 1: Comparison of different types of networks due to the proposed guide-
lines. Scores assigned to the guidelines are a choice made by the authors. Anal-
ysis for Intention (guideline 1), and total score, is given separately for second,
third module respectively.
There is of course no need to use the same type of networks
in every stage of the detection process (guideline 1). In the
prototype system we thus use participants networks in the sec-
ond module (section 4.2), as they provide enough information
for initial suspicious components detection, and COPTA net-
works in the third module (section 4.3), whose adequacy will
be clearer later. Other types of networks are used only for vi-
sualization purposes. Network scores, given in table 1, confirm
this choice.
After the construction of networks is done, the resulting con-
nected components can be quite large (depending on the type of
networks used). As it is expected that groups of fraudsters are
relatively small, the components should in this case be simpli-
fied. We suggest using edge betweenness (Girvan & Newman,
2002) to detect communities in the network (i.e. supersets of
groups of fraudsters) by recursively removing the edges until
the resulting components are small enough. As using edge be-
tweenness assures that we would be removing only the edges
between the communities, and not the edges within communi-
ties, simplification is done without any loss for generality.
4.2. Suspicious components detection
The networks from the first module consist of several con-
nected components. Each component describes a group of re-
lated entities (i.e. participants, due to the type of networks
used), where some of these groups contain fraudulent entities.
Within this module of the system we want to detect such groups
(i.e. fraudulent components) and discard all others, in order to
simplify the subsequent detection process in the third module.
Not all entities in some fraudulent component are necessarily
fraudulent. The purpose of the third module is to identify only
those that are.
Analyses, conducted with the help of a domain expert,
showed that fraudulent components share several structural
characteristics. Such components are usually much larger than
other, non-fraudulent components, and are also denser. The un-
derlying collisions often happened in suspicious circumstances,
and the ratio between the number of collisions and the number
of different drivers is usually close to 1 (for reference, the ra-
tio for completely independent collisions is 2). There are ver-
tices with extremely high degree and centrality. Components
have a small diameter, (short) cycles appear and the size of the
minimum vertex cover is also very small (all due to the size of
the component). There are also other characteristics, all imply-
ing that entities, represented by such components, are unusually
closely related to each other. Example of a fraudulent compo-
nent with many of the mentioned characteristics is shown in
Fig. 4.
Fig. 4: Example of a component of participants network with many of the sus-
picious characteristics shared by fraudulent components.
We have thus identified several indicators of likelihood that
some component is fraudulent (i.e. suspicious component). The
detection of suspicious components is done by assessing these
indicators. Only simple indicators are used (no combinations
of indicators).
Formally, we define an ensemble of n indicators as I =
[I1, I1 . . . In]T . Let c be some connected component in network
G, c ∈ C(G), and let Hi(c) be the value for c of the characteris-
tic, measured by indicator Ii. Then
Ii(c) =
{
1 c has suspicious value of Hi
0 otherwise . (10)
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For the reason of simplicity, all indicators are defined as binary
attributes. For the indicators that measure a characteristic that is
independent of the structure of the component (e.g. number of
vertices, collisions, etc.), simple thresholds are defined in order
to distinguish suspicious components from others (due to this
characteristic). These thresholds are set by the domain expert.
Other characteristics are usually greatly dependent on the
number of the vertices and edges in the component. A sim-
ple threshold strategy thus does not work. Values of such Hi
could of course be “normalized” before the assessment (based
on the number of vertices and edges), but it is often not clear
how. Values could also be assessed using some (supervised)
learning algorithm over a labeled data set, but a huge set would
be needed, as the assessment should be done for each number
of vertices and edges separately (owing to the dependence men-
tioned). What remains is to construct random networks of (pre-
sumably) honest behavior and assess the values of such charac-
teristics using them.
No in-depth analysis of collisions networks has so far been
reported, and it is thus not clear how to construct such ran-
dom networks. General random network generators or mod-
els, e.g. (Barabasi & Albert, 1999; Eppstein & Wang, 2002),
mainly give results far away from the collisions networks (vi-
sually and by assessing different characteristics). Therefore a
sort of rewiring algorithm is employed, initially proposed by
Ball et al. (1997) and Watts & Strogatz (1998).
The algorithm iteratively rewires edges in some component
c, meaning that we randomly choose two edges in Ec, {vi, v j}
and {vk, vl}, and switch one of theirs incident vertices. The re-
sulting edges are e.g. {vi, vl} and {vk, v j} (see Fig. 5). The num-
ber of vertices and edges does not change during the rewiring
process and the values for some Hi can thus be assessed by gen-
erating a sufficient number of such random networks (for each
component).
Fig. 5: Example of a rewired network. Dashed edges are rewired, i.e. replaced
by solid edges.
The details of the rewiring algorithm are omitted due to space
limitations, we only discuss two aspects. First, the number of
rewirings should be kept relatively small (e.g. < |Ec|), otherwise
the constructed networks are completely random with no trace
of the one we start with – (probably) not networks represent-
ing a set of collisions. We also want to compare components to
other random ones, which are similar to them, at least in the as-
pect of this rewirings. If a component significantly differs even
from these similar ones, there is probably some severe anomaly
in it.
Second, one can notice that the algorithm never changes the
degrees of the vertices. As we wish to assess the degrees as
well, the algorithm can be simply adopted to the task in an
ad hoc fashion. We add an extra vertex ve and connect all
other vertices with it. As this vertex is removed at the end,
rewiring one of the newly added edges with some other (old)
edge changes the degrees of the vertices. Let {vi, ve}, {vk, vl} be
the edges being rewired and let {vi, vl}, {vk, ve} be the edges af-
ter the rewiring. The (true) degree of vertex vi, vk was increased,
decreased by one respectively.
To assess the values of indicators we separately construct
random components for each component c ∈ C(G) and indica-
tor Ii ∈ I, and approximate the distributions for characteristics
Hi (Hi are seen as random variables). A statistical test is em-
ployed to test the null hypothesis, if the observed value Hi(c)
comes from the distribution for Hi. The test can be one or two-
tailed, based on the nature of characteristic Hi. In the case of
one-tailed test, where large values of Hi are suspicious, we get
Ii(c) =
{
1 ˆPc(Hi ≥ Hi(c)) < ti
0 otherwise , (11)
where probability density function P(Hi) is approximated with
the generated distribution ˆPc(Hi) and ti is a critical threshold
or acceptable Type I error (e.g. set to 0.05). In the case of
two-tailed test the equation (11) rewrites to
Ii(c) =

1
ˆPc(Hi ≥ Hi(c)) < ti/2 ∨
ˆPc(Hi ≤ Hi(c)) < ti/2
0 otherwise
. (12)
Knowing the values for all indicators Ii we can now indicate
the suspicious components in C(G). The simplest way to ac-
complish this is to use a majority classifier or voter, indicating
all the components, for which at least half of the indicators is set
to 1, as suspicious. Let S (G) be a set of suspicious components
in a network G, S (G) ⊆ C(G), then
S (G) = {c| c ∈ C(G) ∧
n∑
i=1
Ii(c) ≥ n/2}. (13)
When fraudulent components share most of the characteristics,
measured by the indicators, we would clearly indicate them
(they would have most, at least half, of the indicators set). Still,
the approach is rather naive having three major weaknesses
(among others). (1) there is no guarantee that the threshold n/2
is the best choice; (2) we do not consider how many compo-
nents have some particular indicator set; and (3) all indicators
are treated as equally important. Normally, we would use some
sort of supervised learning technique that eliminates this weak-
nesses (e.g. regression, neural networks, classification trees,
etc.), but again, due to the lack of labeled data and skewed class
distribution in the collisions domain, this would only rarely be
feasible (the size of C(G) is even much smaller then the size of
the actual data set).
To cope with the last two weaknesses mentioned, we sug-
gest using principal component analysis of RIDITs (PRIDIT)
proposed by Brockett & Levine (1977) (see (Brockett, 1981)),
which has already been used for detecting fraudulent insurance
claim files (Brockett et al., 2002), but not for detecting groups
of fraudsters (i.e. fraudulent components). The RIDIT analysis
was first introduced by Bross (1958).
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RIDIT is basically a scoring method that transforms a set
of categorical attribute values into a set of values from inter-
val [−1, 1], thus they reflect the probability of an occurrence
of some particular categorical value. Hence, an ordinal scale
attribute is transformed into an interval scale attribute. In our
case, all Ii are simple binary attributes, and the RIDIT scores,
denoted Ri, are then just
Ri(c) =
{
pˆ0i Ii(c) = 1
−pˆ1i Ii(c) = 0
, (14)
where c ∈ C(G), pˆ1i is the relative frequency of Ii being equal to
1, computed from the entire data set, and pˆ0i = 1 − pˆ1i .
We demonstrate the technique with an example. Let pˆ1i be
equal to 0.95 – almost all of the components have the indicator
Ii set. The RIDIT score for some component c, with Ii(c) = 1,
is then just 0.05, as the indicator clearly gives a poor indication
of fraudulent components. On the other hand, for some compo-
nent c, with Ii(c) = 0, the RIDIT score is −0.95, since the indi-
cator very likely gives a good indication of the non-fraudulent
components. Similar intuitive explanation can be made by set-
ting pˆ1i to 0.05. A full discussion of RIDIT scoring is omitted,
for more details see (Brockett, 1981; Brockett & Levine, 1977).
Introduction of RIDIT scoring diminishes previously men-
tioned second weakness. To also cope with the third, we make
use of the PRIDIT technique. The intuition of this technique
is that we can weight indicators in some ensemble by assess-
ing the agreement of some particular indicator with the entire
ensemble. We make a (probably incorrect) assumption that in-
dicators are independent.
Formally, let W be a vector of weights for the ensem-
ble of RIDIT scorers Ri for indicators Ii, denoted W =
[w1,w2 . . .wn]T , and let R be a matrix with i, jth component
equal to R j(c), where c is an ith component in C(G). Matrix
product RW gives the ensemble’s score for all the components,
i.e. ith component in vector RW is equal to the weighted linear
combination of RIDIT scores for ith component in C(G). De-
note S = RW, we can then assess indicators agreement with
entire ensemble as (written in matrix form)
RT S/ ‖ RT S ‖ . (15)
Equation (15) computes normalized scalar products of columns
of R, which corresponds to the returned values of RIDIT scor-
ers, and S , which is the overall score of the entire ensemble (for
each component in C(G)). When the returned values of some
scorer are completely orthogonal to the ensemble’s scores, the
resulting normalized scalar product equals 0, and reaches its
maximum, or minimum, when they are perfectly aligned.
Equation (15) thus gives scorers (indicators) agreement with
the ensemble and can be used to assign new weights, i.e. W1 =
RT S/||RT S ||. Greater weights are assigned to the scorers that
kind of agree with the general belief of the ensemble. Denote
S 1 = RW1, then S 1 is a vector of overall scores using these
newly determined weights. There is of course no reason to stop
the process here, as we can iteratively get even better weights.
We can write
W i =
RT S i−1
||RT S i−1||
=
RT RW i−1
||RT RW i−1||
(16)
for i ≥ 1, which can be used to iteratively compute better and
better weights for an ensemble of RIDIT scorers Ri, starting
with some weights, e.g. W0 = [1, 1 . . .1] – the process con-
verges to some fixed point no matter the starting weights (due
to some assumptions). It can be shown that the fixed point is ac-
tually the first principal component of the matrix RT R denoted
W∞. For more details on PRIDIT technique see (Brockett et al.,
2002).
We can now score each component in C(G) using the PRIDIT
technique for indicators Ii and output as suspicious all the com-
ponents, with a score greater than 0. Thus
S (G) = {c| c ∈ C(G) ∧ R(c)W∞ ≥ 0}, (17)
where R(c) is a row of matrix R, that corresponds to component
c. Again there is no guarantee, that the threshold 0 is the best
choice. Still, if we know the expected proportion of fraudulent
components in the data set (or e.g. expected number of fraudu-
lent collisions), we can first rank the components using PRIDIT
technique and then output only the appropriate proportion of
most highly ranked components.
4.3. Suspicious entities detection
In the third module of the system key entities are detected
inside each previously identified suspicious component. We
focus on identifying key participants, that can be later used
for the identification of other key entities (collisions, vehicles,
etc.). Key participants are identified by employing Iterative As-
sessment Algorithm (IAA) that uses intrinsic and relational at-
tributes of the entities. The algorithm assigns a suspicion score
to each participant, which corresponds to the likelihood of it
being fraudulent.
In classical approaches over flat data, entities are assessed
using only their intrinsic attributes, thus they are assessed
in complete isolation to other entities. It has been empir-
ically shown that the assessment can be improved by also
considering the related entities, more precisely, by consider-
ing the assessment of the related entities (Chakrabarti et al.,
1998; Domingos & Richardson, 2001; Lu & Getoor, 2003a,b;
Neville & Jensen, 2000). The assessment of an entity is in-
ferred from the assessments of the related entities and propa-
gated onward. Still, incorporating only the intrinsic attributes
of the related entities generally doesn’t improve, or even de-
teriorates, the assessment (Chakrabarti et al., 1998; Oh et al.,
2000).
The proposed IAA algorithm thus assesses the entities by also
considering the assessment of their related entities. As these re-
lated entities were also assessed using the assessments of their
related entities, and so on, the entire network is used in the as-
sessment of some particular entity. This could not be achieved
otherwise, as the formulation would surely be too complex. We
proceed by introducing IAA in a general form.
Let c be some suspicious component in network G, c ∈ S (G),
and let vi be one of its vertices, vi ∈ Vc. Furthermore, let N(vi)
be a set of neighbor vertices of vi (i.e. vertices at distance 1)
and V(vi) = N(vi) ∪ {vi}, and let E(vi) be a set of edges incident
to vi (i.e. E(vi) = {e| e ∈ Ec ∧ vi ∈ e}). Let also eni be an
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entity corresponding to vertex vi and N(eni), V(eni) be a set of
entities that corresponds to N(vi), V(vi) respectively. We define
the suspicion score s, s(·) ≥ 0, for the entity eni as
s(eni) = AM(s(N(eni)),V(eni),V(vi), E(vi)) (18)
= AM(i, c),
where AM is some assessment model and s(N(eni)) is a set of
suspicion scores for entities in N(eni). The suspicion of some
entity is dependent on the assessment of the related entities (first
argument in equation (18)), on the intrinsic attributes of related
entities and itself (second argument), and on the relational at-
tributes of the entity (last two arguments). We assume that AM
is linear in the assessments of the related entities (i.e. s(N(eni)))
and that it returns higher values for fraudulent entities.
For some entity eni, when the suspicion scores of the related
entities are known, eni can be assessed using equation (18).
Commonly, none of the suspicion scores are known preliminary
(as the data set is unlabeled), and the equation thus cannot be
used in a common manner. Still, one can incrementally assess
the entities in an iterative fashion, similar to e.g. (Brin & Page,
1998; Kleinberg, 1999).
Let s0(·) be some set of suspicion scores, e.g. s0(·) = 1. We
can then assess the entities using scores s0(·) and equation (18),
and get better scores s1(·). We proceed with this process, itera-
tively refining the scores until some stopping criteria is reached.
Generally, on the kth iteration, entities are assessed using
sk(eni) = AM(sk−1(N(eni)),V(eni),V(vi), E(vi)) (19)
= AM(i, k, c).
Note that the choice for s0(·) is arbitrary – the process converges
to some fixed point no matter the starting scores (due to some
assumptions). Hence, the entities are assessed without prelimi-
nary knowing any suspicion score to bootstrap the procedure.
We present the IAA algorithm below.
IAA algorithm
s0(·) = 1
k = 1
WHILE NOT stopping criteria DO
FOR ∀vi, eni DO
sk(eni) = αsk−1(eni) + (1 − α)AM(i, k, c)
FOR ∀vi, eni: vi non-bucket DO
normalize sk(eni)
k = k + 1
RETURN sk(·)
Entities are iteratively assessed using model AM (α is a
smoothing parameter set to e.g. 0.75). In order for the pro-
cess to converge, scores corresponding to non-bucket vertices
are normalized at the end of each iteration. Due to the fact
that relations represented by the networks are often not binary,
there are usually some vertices only serving as buckets that store
the suspicion assessed at this iteration to be propagated on the
next. Non-bucket vertices correspond to entities that are actu-
ally being assessed and only these scores should be normalized
(for binary relations all the vertices are of this kind). Struc-
ture of such bucket networks would typically correspond to bi-
partite graphs4 – bucket vertices would only be connected to
non-bucket vertices (and vice versa). In the case of COPTA
networks, used in this module of the (prototype) system, bucket
vertices are those representing collisions.
One would intuitively run the algorithm until some fixed
point is reached, i.e. when the scores no longer change. We
empirically show that, despite the fact that iterative assessment
does indeed increase the performance, such approach actually
decreases it. The reason is that the scores over-fit the model.
We also show, that superior performance can be achieved with
a dynamic approach – by running the algorithm for d(c) itera-
tions (diameter of component c). For more see sections 5, 6.
Note that if each subsequent iteration of the algorithm ac-
tually increased the performance, one could assess the entities
directly. When AM is linear in the assessments of related enti-
ties, the model could be written as a set of linear equations and
solved exactly (analytically).
An arbitrary model can be used with the algorithm. We
propose several linear models based on the observation that in
many of these bucket networks the following holds: every en-
tity is well defined with (only) the entities directly connected
to it, considering the context observed. E.g. in the case of
COPTA networks, every collision is connected to its partici-
pants, who are clearly the ones who “define” the collision, and
every participant is connected with its collisions, which are the
precise aspect of the participant we wish to investigate when
dealing with fraud detection. Similar discussion could be made
for movie-actor, corporate board-director and other well known
collaboration networks. A model using no attributes of the en-
tities is thus simply the sum of suspicion scores of the related
entities (we omit the arguments of the model)
AMraw =
∑
{vi ,v j}∈E(vi )
s(en j). (20)
Our empirical evaluation shows that even such a simple model
can achieve satisfactory performance.
To incorporate entities’ attributes into the model, we intro-
duce factors. These are based on intrinsic or relational attributes
of entities. The intuition behind the first is that some intrinsic
attributes’ values are highly correlated with fraudulent activity.
Suspicion scores of corresponding entities should in this case
be increased and also propagated on the related entities. More-
over, many of the relational attributes (i.e. labels of the edges)
increase the likelihood of fraudulent activity – the propagation
of suspicion over such edges should also be increased.
Let lEG be the edge labeling function and ΣEG the alphabet of
all possible edge labels, i.e. ΣEG = {Driver, Passenger . . .} (for
COPTA networks). Furthermore, let En be a set of all entities
eni. We define Fint, Frel to be the factors, corresponding to
intrinsic, relational attributes respectively, as
Fint : En → [0,∞), (21)
Frel : ΣEG → [0,∞). (22)
4In the social science literature bipartite graphs are known as collaboration
networks.
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Improved model incorporating these factors is then
AMbas = Fint(eni)
∑
e={vi,v j}∈E(vi )
Frel(lEG (e)) s(en j). (23)
Factors Fint are computed from (similar for Frel)
Fint(eni) =
∏
k
Fkint(eni) (24)
where
Fkint(eni) =
{
1/(1 − f kint(eni)) f kint(eni) ≥ 0
1 + f kint(eni) otherwise
(25)
and
f kint : En → (−1, 1). (26)
f kint are virtual factors defined by the domain expert. The trans-
formation with equation (25) is done only to define factors on
the interval (−1, 1), rather than on [0,∞). The first is more intu-
itive as e.g. two “opposite” factors are now f and − f , f ∈ [0, 1),
opposed to f and 1/ f , f > 0, before.
Some virtual factor f kint can be an arbitrary function defined
due to a single attribute of some entity, or due to several at-
tributes formulating correlations between the attributes. When
attributes’ values correspond to some suspicious activity (e.g.
collision corresponds to some classical scheme), factors are set
to be close to 1, and close to −1, when values correspond to
non-suspicious activity (e.g. children in the vehicle). Other-
wise, they are set to be 0.
Note that assessment of some participant with models AMraw
and AMbas is highly dependent on the number of collisions this
participant was involved in. More precisely, on the number of
the terms in the sums in equations (20), (23) (which is exactly
the degree of the corresponding vertex). Although this property
is not vain, we still implicitly assume we posses all of the colli-
sions a certain participant was involved in. This assumption is
often not true (in practice).
We propose a third model diminishing the mentioned as-
sumption. Let dG be the average degree of the vertices in net-
work G, dG = ave{d(vk)| vk ∈ VG}. The model is
AMmean· =
dG + d(vi)
2
AM·
d(vi) =
1 + dGd(vi)
 AM·2 , (27)
where AM· can be any of the models AMraw, AMbas. AMmean·
averages terms in the sum of the model AM·, and multiplies this
average by the mean of vertex’s degree and the average degree
over all the vertices in VG. Thus a sort of Laplace smoothing
is employed that pulls the vertex degree toward the average, in
order to diminish the importance of this parameter in the final
assessment. Empirical analysis in section 5 shows that such a
model outperforms the other two.
Knowing scores s(·) for all the entities in some connected
component c ∈ G, one can rank them according to the suspicion
of their being fraudulent. In order to also compare the entities
from various components, scores must be normalized appropri-
ately (e.g. multiplied with the number of collisions represented
by component c).
4.4. Final remarks
In the previous section (third module of the system) we fo-
cused only on detection of fraudulent participants. Their sus-
picion scores can now be used for assessment of other entities
(e.g. collisions, vehicles), using one of the assessment models
proposed in section 4.3.
When all of the most highly ranked participants in some
suspicious component are directly connected to each other (or
through buckets), they are proclaimed to belong to the same
group of fraudsters. Otherwise they belong to several groups.
During the investigation process, the domain expert or investi-
gator analyzes these groups and determines further actions for
resolving potential fraud. Entities are investigated in the order
induced by scores s(·).
Networks also allow a neat visualization of the assessment
(see Fig. 6).
Fig. 6: Four COPTA networks showing same group of collisions. Size of the
participants’ vertices correspond to their suspicion score; only participants with
score above some threshold, and connecting collisions, are shown on each net-
work. The contour was drawn based on the harmonic mean distance to every
vertex, weighted by the suspicion scores. (Blue) filled collisions’ vertices in the
first network correspond to collisions that happened at night.
5. Evaluation with the prototype system
We implemented a prototype system to empirically evaluate
the performance of the proposition. Furthermore, various com-
ponents of the system are analyzed and compared to other ap-
proaches. To simulate realistic conditions, the data set used for
evaluation consisted only of the data, that can be easily (auto-
matically) retrieved from police records (semistructured data).
We report results of the assessment of participants (not e.g. col-
lisions).
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5.1. Data
The data set consists of 3451 participants involved in 1561
collisions in Slovenia between the years 1999 and 2008. The
set was made by merging two data sets, one labeled and one
unlabeled.
The first, labeled, consists of collisions corresponding to pre-
viously identified fraudsters and some other participants, which
were investigated in the past. In a few cases, when class of a
participant could not be determined, it was set according to the
domain expert’s and investigator’s belief. As the purpose of our
system is to identify groups of fraudsters, and not some iso-
lated fraudulent collisions, (almost) all isolated collisions were
removed from this set. It is thus a bit smaller (i.e. 211 partici-
pants, 91 collisions), but still large enough to make the assess-
ment.
To achieve a more realistic class distribution and better statis-
tics for PRIDIT analysis, the second larger data set was merged
with the first. The set consists of various collisions chosen (al-
most) at random, although some of them are still related with
others. Since random data sampling is not advised for relational
data (Jensen, 1999), this set is used explicitly for PRIDIT analy-
sis. Both data sets consist of only standard collisions (e.g. there
are no chain collisions involving numerous vehicles or coaches
with many passengers).
Class distribution for the data set can be seen in table 2.
Class distribution
Count Proportion
Fraudster 46 1.3% 21.8%
Non-fraudster 165 4.8% 78.2%
Unlabeled 3240 93.9%
Table 2: Class distribution for the data set used in the analysis of the proposed
expert system.
The entire assessment was made using the merged data set,
while the reported results naturally only correspond to the first
(labeled) set. Note that the assessment of entities in some con-
nected component is completely independent of the entities in
other components (except for PRIDIT analysis).
5.2. Results
Performance of the system depends on random generation of
networks, used for detection of suspicious components (second
module). We construct 200 random networks for each indicator
and each component (equations (11), (12)), however, the re-
sults still vary a little. The entire assessment was thus repeated
20 times and the scores were averaged. To assess the ranking
of the system, average AUC (Area Under Curve) scores were
computed, AUC. Results given in tables 5, 6, 7, 8 are all AUC.
In order to obtain a standard for other analyses, we first
report the performance of the system that uses PRIDIT anal-
ysis for fraudulent components detection, and IAA algorithm
with model AMmeanbas for fraudulent entities detection, denoted
IAAmeanbas (see table 3). Various metrics are computed, i.e. clas-
sification accuracy (CA), recall (true positive rate), precision
Golden standard
CA 0.8720
Recall 0.8913
Precision 0.6508
Specificity 0.8667
F1 score 0.7523
AUC 0.9228
Table 3: Performance of the system that uses PRIDIT analysis with IAAmeanbas
algorithm. Various metrics are reported; all except AUC are computed so the
total cost (on the first run) is minimal.
(positive predictive value), specificity (1− false positive rate),
F1 score (harmonic mean of recall and precision) and AUC.
All but last are metrics that assess the classification of some ap-
proach, thus a threshold for suspicion scores must be defined.
We report the results from the first run that minimize the to-
tal cost, assuming the cost of misclassified fraudsters and non-
fraudsters is the same. Same holds for confusion matrix seen in
table 4.
Confusion matrix
Suspicious Unsuspicious
Fraudster 41 5
Non-fraudster 22 143
Table 4: Confusion matrix for the system that uses PRIDIT analysis with
IAAmeanbas algorithm (determined so the total cost on the first run is minimal).
We proceed with an in-depth analysis of the proposed IAA
algorithm. Table 5 shows the results of the comparison of
different assessment models, i.e. IAAraw, IAAbas, IAAmeanraw
and IAAmeanbas . Factors for models IAAbas and IAA
mean
bas (equa-
tion (25)) were set by the domain expert, with the help of sta-
tistical analysis of data from collisions. To further analyze the
impact of factors on final assessment, an additional set of fac-
tors was defined by the authors. Values were set due to authors’
intuition; corresponding models are IAAint and IAAmeanint . Re-
sults of the analysis can be seen in table 6.
Assessment models
PRIDIT
IAAraw IAAbas IAAmeanraw IAAmeanbas
0.8872 0.9145 0.8942 0.9228
Table 5: Comparison of different assessment models for IAA algorithm (after
PRIDIT analysis).
As already mentioned, the performance of the IAA algorithm
depends on the number of iterations made in the assessment
(see section 4.3). We have thus plotted the AUC scores with
respect to the number of iterations made (for the first run), in
order to clearly see the dependence; plots for IAAmeanraw , IAAmeanbas
can be seen in Fig. 7, Fig. 8 respectively. We also show that su-
perior performance can be achieved, if the number of iterations
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Factors
ALL
IAAmeanraw IAAmeanint IAA
mean
bas
0.8188 0.8435 0.8787
PRIDIT
IAAmeanraw IAAmeanint IAA
mean
bas
0.8942 0.9086 0.9228
Table 6: Analysis of the impact of factors on the final assessment (on all the
components and after PRIDIT analysis).
is set dynamically. More precisely, the number of iterations
made for some component c ∈ C(G) is
max{dG, d(c)}, (28)
where d(c) is the diameter of c and dG the average diameter over
all the components. All other results reported in this analysis
used such a dynamic setting.
Fig. 7: AUC scores with respect to the number of iterations made in the IAA
algorithm. Solid curves correspond to IAAmeanraw algorithm after PRIDIT analysis
and dashed curves to IAAmeanraw algorithm ran on all the components. Straight
line segments show the scores achieved with dynamic setting of the number of
iterations (see text).
Fig. 8: AUC scores with respect to the number of iterations made in the IAA
algorithm. Solid curves correspond to IAAmeanbas algorithm after PRIDIT analysis
and dashed curves to IAAmeanbas algorithm ran on all the components. Straight
line segments show the scores achieved with dynamic setting of the number of
iterations (see text).
Due to the lack of other expert system approaches for detect-
ing groups of fraudsters, or even individual fraudsters (accord-
ing to our knowledge), no comparative analysis of such kind
could be made. The proposed IAA algorithm is thus compared
against several well known measures for anomaly detection in
networks – betweenness centrality (BetCen), closeness central-
ity (CloCen), distance centrality (DisCen) and eigenvector cen-
trality (EigCen) (Freeman, 1977, 1979). They are defined as
BetCen(vi) =
∑
v j ,vk∈Vc
gv j,vk (vi)
gv j,vk
, (29)
CloCen(vi) = 1
nc − 1
∑
v j∈Vc\vi
d(vi, v j), (30)
DegCen(vi) = d(vi)
nc − 1
, (31)
EigCen(vi) = 1
λ
∑
{vi ,v j}∈Ec
EigCen(v j), (32)
where nc is the number of vertices in component c, nc = |Vc|,
λ is a constant, gv j,vk is the number of geodesics between ver-
tices v j and vk and gv j,vk (vi) the number of such geodesics that
pass through vertex vi, i , j , k. For further discussion see
(Freeman, 1977, 1979; Newman, 2003).
These measures of centrality were used to assign suspicion
score to each participant; scores were also appropriately nor-
malized as in the case of IAA algorithm. For a fair comparison,
measures were compared against the model that uses no intrin-
sic attributes of entities, i.e. IAAmeanraw . The results of the analysis
are shown in table 7.
IAA algorithm
ALL
BetCen CloCen DegCen EigCen IAAmeanraw
0.6401 0.8138 0.7428 0.7300 0.8188
PRIDIT
BetCen CloCen DegCen EigCen IAAmeanraw
0.6541 0.8158 0.8597 0.8581 0.8942
Table 7: Comparison of the IAA algorithm against several well known measures
for anomaly detection in networks (on all the components and after PRIDIT
analysis). For a fair comparison, no intrinsic attributes are used in the IAA
algorithm (i.e. model AMmeanraw ).
Next, we analyzed different approaches for detection of
fraudulent components (see table 8). The same set of 9 indi-
cators was used for the majority voter (equation (13)) and for
(P)RIDIT analysis (equation (17)). For the latter, we use a vari-
ant of random undersampling (RUS), to cope with skewed class
distribution. We output most highly ranked components, thus
the set of selected components contain 4% of all the collisions
(in the merged data set) Analyses of automobile insurance fraud
mainly agree that up to 20% of all the collisions are fraudu-
lent, and up to 20% of the latter correspond to non-opportunistic
fraud (various resources). However, for the majority voter, such
an approach actually decreases performance – we therefore re-
port results where all components, with at least half of the indi-
cators set, are selected.
Several individual indicators, achieving superior perfor-
mance, are also reported. Indicator IBetCen is based on be-
tweenness centrality (equation (30)), IMinCov on minimum ver-
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tex cover and Il−1 on l−1 measure defined as the harmonic mean
distance between every pair of vertices in some component c,
l−1 = 11
2 nc(nc + 1)
∑
vi,v j∈Vc,i≥ j
d(vi, v j)−1. (33)
Fraudulent components
IMinCov Il−1 IBetCen MAJOR RIDIT PRIDIT
ALL
0.6019 0.6386 0.6774 0.7946 0.6843 0.7114
IMinCov Il−1 IBetCen MAJOR RIDIT PRIDIT
IAAmeanbas
0.6119 0.8494 0.8549 0.8507 0.9221 0.9228
Table 8: Comparison of different approaches for detection of fraudulent com-
ponents (prior to no fraudulent entities detection and IAAmeanbas ).
We last analyze the importance of proper data representa-
tion for detection of groups of fraudsters – the use of networks.
Networks were thus transformed into flat data and some stan-
dard unsupervised learning techniques were examined (e.q. k-
means, hierarchical clustering). We obtained no results com-
parable to those given in table 3.
Furthermore, we tested nine standard supervised data-mining
techniques to analyze the compensation of data labels for the
inappropriate representation of data. We used (default) im-
plementations of classifiers in Orange data-mining software
(Demsar et al., 2004) and 20-fold cross validation was em-
ployed as the validation technique. Best performance, up to
AUC ≈ 0.86, was achieved with Naive Bayes, support vec-
tor machines, random forest and, interestingly, also k-nearest
neighbors classifier. Scores for other approaches were below
AUC = 0.80 (e.g. logistic regression, classification trees, etc.).
6. Discussion
Empirical evaluation from the previous section shows that
automobile insurance fraud can be detected using the proposi-
tion. Moreover, the results suggest that appropriate data repre-
sentation is vital – even a simple approach over networks can
detect a great deal of fraud. The following section discusses the
results in greater detail (in the order given).
Almost all of the metrics obtained with PRIDIT analysis and
IAAmeanbas algorithm, golden standard, are very high (table 3).
Only precision appears low, still this results (only) from the
skewed class distribution in the domain. The F1 measure is
consequently also a bit lower, else the performance of the sys-
tem is more than satisfactory. The latter was confirmed by the
experts and investigators from a Slovenian insurance company,
who were also pleased with the visual representation of the re-
sults.
The confusion matrix given in table 4 shows that we correctly
classified almost 90% of all fraudsters and over 85% of non-
fraudsters. Only 5 fraudsters were not detected by the proto-
type system. We thus obtained a particularly high recall, which
is essential for all fraud detection systems. The majority of un-
labeled participants were classified as unsuspicious (not shown
in table 4), but the corresponding collisions are mainly isolated
and the participants could have been trivially eliminated any-
way (for our purposes).
We proceed with discussion of different assessment models
(table 5). Performance of the simplest of the models IAAraw,
which uses no domain expert’s knowledge, could already prove
sufficient in many circumstances. It can still be significantly
improved by also considering the factors, set by the domain
expert (model IAAbas). Model IAAmean· further improves the
assessment of both (simple) models, confirming the hypothe-
sis behind it (see section 4.3). Although the models (probably
incorrectly) assume that the fraudulence of an entity is linear
(in the fraudulences of the related entities), they give a good
approximation of the fraudulent behavior.
The analysis of the factors used in the models confirms
their importance for the final assessment. As expected,
model IAAmeanbas outperforms IAA
mean
int , and the latter outperforms
IAAmeanraw (table 6). First, this confirms the hypothesis that do-
main knowledge can be incorporated into the model using fac-
tors (as defined in section 4.3). Second, it shows that better
understanding of the domain can improve assignment of fac-
tors. Combination of both makes the system extremely flexible,
allowing for detection of new types of fraud immediately after
they have been noticed by the domain expert or investigator.
As already mentioned, running the IAA algorithm for too
long over-fits the model and decreases algorithm’s final perfor-
mance (see Fig. 7, Fig. 8, note different scales used). Early
iterations of the algorithm still increase the performance in all
cases analyzed, which proves the importance of iterative assess-
ment as opposed to single-pass approach. However, after some
particular number of iterations has been reached, performance
decreases (at least slightly). Also note that the decrease is much
larger in the case of AMmeanraw model than AMmeanbas , indicating that
the latter is superior to the first. We propose to use this decrease
in performance as an additional evaluation of any model used
with IAA, or similar, algorithm.
It is preferable to run the algorithm for only a few iterations
for one more reason. Networks are often extremely large, es-
pecially when they describe many characteristics of entities. In
this case, running the algorithm until some fixed point is sim-
ply not feasible. Since the prototype system uses only the basic
attributes of the entities, the latter does not present a problem.
The number of iterations that achieves the best performance
clearly depends on various factors (data set, model, etc.). Our
evaluation shows that superior, or at least very good, perfor-
mance (Fig. 7, Fig. 8) can be achieved with the use of a dynamic
setting of the number of iterations (equation (28)).
When no detection of fraudulent components is done, the
comparison between IAA algorithm and measures of central-
ity shows no significant difference (table 7). On the other hand,
when we use PRIDIT analysis for fraudulent components de-
tection, the IAA algorithm dominates others. Still, the results
obtained with DegCen and EigCen are comparable to those ob-
tained with supervised approaches over flat data. This shows
that even a simple approach can detect a reasonably large por-
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tion of fraud, if appropriate representation of data is used (net-
works).
The analysis of different approaches for detection of fraudu-
lent components produces no major surprises (table 8) – the best
results are obtained using (P)RIDIT analysis. Note that a single
indicator can match the performance of majority classifier MA-
JOR, confirming its naiveness (see section 4.2); exceptionally
high AUC score obtained by MAJOR, prior to no fraudulent en-
tities detection, only results from the fact, that the returned set
of suspicious components is almost 10-times smaller than for
other approaches. The precision of the approach is thus much
higher, but for the price of lower recall (useless for fraud detec-
tion).
We have already discussed the purpose of hierarchical detec-
tion of groups of fraudsters – to simplify detection of fraud-
ulent entities with appropriate detection of fraudulent compo-
nents. Another implication of such an approach is also simpler,
or is some cases even feasible, data collection process. As the
detection of components is done using only the relations be-
tween entities (relational attributes), a large portion of data can
be discarded without knowing the values of any of the intrinsic
attributes. This characteristic of the system is vital when de-
ploying in practice – (complete) data often cannot be obtained
for all the participants, due to sensitivity of the domain.
Last, we briefly discuss the applicability of the proposition
in other domains. The presented IAA algorithm can be used for
arbitrary assessment of entities over some relational domain,
exploring the relations between entities with no demand for an
(initial) labeled data set. When every entity is well defined with
(only) the entities directly related to it, considering the context
observed, one of the proposed assessment models can also be
used. Furthermore, the presented framework (four modules of
the system) could be employed for fraud detection in other do-
mains. The system is also applicable for use in other domains,
where we are interested in groups of related entities sharing
some particular characteristics. The framework exploits the re-
lations between entities, in order to improve the assessment,
and is structured hierarchically, to make it applicable in prac-
tice.
7. Conclusion
The article proposes a novel expert system approach for de-
tection of groups of automobile insurance fraudsters with net-
works. Empirical evaluation shows that such fraud can be ef-
ficiently detected using the proposition and, in particular, that
proper representation of data is vital. For the system to be appli-
cable in practice, no labeled data set is used. The system rather
allows the imputation of domain expert’s knowledge, and it can
thus be adopted to new types of fraud as soon as they are no-
ticed. The approach can aid the domain investigator to detect
and investigate fraud much faster and more efficiently. More-
over, the employed framework is easy to implement and is also
applicable for detection (of fraud) in other relational domains.
Future research will be focused on further analyses of dif-
ferent assessment models for IAA algorithm, considering also
the nonlinear models. Moreover, the IAA will be altered into
an unsupervised algorithm, learning the factors of the model
in an unsupervised manner during the actual assessment. The
factors would thus not have to be specified by the domain ex-
pert. Applications of the system in other domains will also be
investigated.
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